B. How Personal Union is Possible on the Part of the Person Assuming

17. About the second point [n.13] I say that if it were repugnant to the divine person thus to assume or to be the term of dependence of human nature, this would be either insofar as it was a divine person or insofar as it was ‘this person’:

Not in the first way, because this dependence does not imply anything repugnant to the divine nature or person (because it implies neither composition, nor potentiality, nor limitation); for it is only necessary that ‘what is the term of this dependence’ be in itself something independent, having entity as is required for being the term of this dependence; nor does any composition or potentiality follow (as is plain), nor any dependence in the divine person, because it is not necessary for the person to be really related but only that it be the term of the dependence of the human nature assumed relatively to it.

Nor second is there any repugnance on the part of the divine person insofar as it is a ‘this’, namely that ‘this one person’ unites and not another, because although a respect consequent to nature by outward respect (as of triple causality) or ‘to be the term of such respect’ is common to the three, and     therefore all causality with respect to the creature belongs to the three, yet it is not necessary that the respect in question here, which is not consequent to quidditative or personal entity, be common to the three (for any independent personal entity can be a sufficient term of this dependence; such is the entity proper to any person, even as it is distinguished from another person; therefore etc     .).

18. But there is another proof of this [from William of Ware], that a divine person contains and includes in itself virtually the perfection of any created person; therefore it can with respect to created nature supply the place of uncreated nature and of created person so as to be the term of dependence of created nature.

19. This argument is deficient in three ways:

First in accord with those who argue like this, because they posit that personal reality in divinity is not a perfection simply; but that which is a reason for containing virtually many perfections and - as relates to itself - infinite perfections, must be a perfection simply; but a divine person, if it contained the realities of one created person, would by parity of reason also contain infinite realities, and so its personal entity would be a perfection simply, which they deny.

20. Further, as perfect a containing exists in the divine essence with respect to created nature as exists in a divine person with respect to a created person, nay even more so, because the divine essence is absolutely infinite, but not so the personal entity; but the essence cannot of its perfection be formally the essence of any created person so as to take the place formally of the created nature, however much it contains it virtually; therefore much more is the person not able to supply for the created person with respect to created personhood.

21. Hence it is not because of the perfection of personal entity that the person contains virtually any created personhood, but because the personal entity is independent, - and as independent, insofar as it is such, it can be the term of dependence on it of something else which is of a nature to have such a term; but this dependence is of a nature to have the person for term and not the nature; therefore an independent divine person can sufficiently be the term of such dependence on it of the created nature.